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I am a firm believer in giving credit where credit is due. Anyone who has read a 
Berkshire Hathaway Chairman's Letter is aware that Buffett too is fond of 
complementing those responsible for his success. The appreciation he expresses to his 
professor, Ben Graham, is appropriate for inclusion in this paper, for it captures the 
importance of an influential Mentor. I have had the pleasure of spending the better half of 
my undergraduate study under such a Mentor, Dr. AI Auxier. To him lowe a great debt 
(Long-term debt of course). Fortunately in his lending he supplied me the tools for 
repaying it. 
A bit of nostalgia: It was exactly 50 years ago that I entered Ben Graham's class 
at Columbia. During the decade before, I had enjoyed - make that loved-
analyzing, buying and selling stocks. But my results were no better than average. 
Beginning in 1951 my performance improved. No, I hadn't changed my diet or 
taken up exercise. The only new ingredient was Ben's ideas. Quite simply, a few 
hours spent at the feet of the master proved far more valuable to me than ten years 
of supposedly original thinking. 
4 
In addition to being a great teacher, Ben was a wonderful friend. My debt to him 
is incalculable. 1 
Dr. Auxier's personal investment performance consistently outpaces the 
investment herd on Wall Street. His record could have undoubtedly reserved him a spot 
amongst the most successful professional money managers should he have chosen to 
forego teaching. However, he saw the returns of investing in students as a chance for 
long-term rewards much greater than anything ever gained in the market. His greatest 
returns will be earned for many years to come. 
I Warren Buffett, 2000 Annual Report, p. 19 
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Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will 
continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and 
those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.2 
Introduction 
There are a great number of books lining the shelves of our nation's bookstores 
and, presumably, those of American homes which claim to hold the key to the investment 
treasure chest. As with most things that seem too good to be true, investing made easy is 
not investing at all; it is something more akin to gambling. I have never met or read of 
anyone building substantial wealth in a casino, and unfortunately here too the house 
always wins. Investing is not easy. However, a well-trained student of investments can 
beat the house. 
Becoming a successful investor is a time and effort intensive endeavor. In fact, I 
can think of no simpler and more transparent comparison than to explain the development 
of investing prowess in the context of athletics. The investor must first understand his 
strengths and limitations, what Warren Buffete describes as defining a "circle of 
competence." The size of this circle is not important, but knowing its boundaries is 
essential. An honest assessment of one's own ability allows the investor to properly 
position himself to use his strengths and defend against having his weaknesses exploited. 
From this point the student of investments must engage himself in mental and 
physical exercises that will prepare him for the challenges and opportunities of the sport. 
2 Warren Buffett, Superinveslors from Graham-and-Doddsville, p. 301 of the Appendix of Benjamin 
Graham's The Intelligent Investor. 
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Rigorous training distinguished by an intense work ethic will position the student to enter 
the game with discipline and intelligence. However, all is in vain if one pursues victory 
without a clearly defined game-plan. Like the quick and strong rookie who enters his first 
boxing match with a well-coached but aging veteran, an unfocused investor will 
frantically throw punches that miss the mark. Despite being physically superior, the 
rookie quickly exhausts his advantage. This reckless approach results in his being 
severely punished. 
Talent can be out-coached and out-worked in the athletic arena. The same 
principle applies to investments. An athlete can run the race faster than anyone else, but 
he had better be running the right direction. Therefore, it is important to maximize the 
effectiveness of your hard work by applying it within the right system. The most 
successful system was developed over seventy-years ago by the legendary "coach" 
Benjamin Graham4. His disciples have been consistently winning championships for the 
past five decades. 
Despite the track record of his trainees (most notably Warren Buffett), business 
schools across the country insist on spending the majority of their time teaching about 
Modern Portfolio Theory, Efficient Market Theory and Beta. These financial theories call 
for abstract mathematical reasoning that often leaves students confused and frustrated. 
They appeal to the more "talented" students, for they suggest that Wall Street's consensus 
view that intellectual superiority is directly correlated with investment success. The 
research collected within this paper suggests otherwise. In fact, Graham had something to 
3 Buffett is the COE of Berkshire Hathaway and arguably the world's foremost investment authority. At the 
time of this writing, he is the second richest man in the world. 
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say on this matter: "In the stock market the more elaborate and abstruse the mathematics 
the more uncertain and speculative the conclusion we draw therefrom ... Whenever 
calculus is brought in, or higher algebra, you could take it as a warning signal that the 
operator was trying to substitute theory for experience.,,5 
With so many brilliant minds at work on Wall Street, it is of some significance to 
note that the majority of money managers consistently lag the market indexes. What 
could be the reason for this lag? In short, few money managers take the time to figure out 
what works and develop a set of investment principles to guide their investment decisions 
before setting out to mange money. They forget that championship teams play according 
to championship game-plans. This is an issue that Charlie Munger6 spoke about 
brilliantly in an address where he spoke of the need to develop models to guide our 
behavior: "Without models or principles, one is just flailing in the dark and mistaking 
luck for success.,,7 
Therefore, it should be the goal of every student interested in consistently 
outperforming the market indexes to learn and adopt an investment model from which he 
can direct his investment decisions. It is not surprising that noted investor Sir John 
Templeton8 is a proponent of studying success: "It's only common sense to study success 
- not only in investments, but in all facets of life.,,9 Thus, it shall be the purpose of this 
4 Graham was a professor of investments at Columbia Business School, mentor to Buffett, and author of 
Securtiy Analysis and The Intelligent Investor. He also ran Graham-Newman Corporation, a successful 
investment vehicle. 
5 Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker, Penguin, 1989, p. 65. 
6 Charlie Munger is the Vice-Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway. A detailed story of his life can be read in 
Janet Lowe's new biography titled Damn Right! 
7 Christopher H. Browne, Value Investing and Behavioral Finance, 2000, p. 2. 
8 Sir John Templeton was born in 1912, raised in Winchester, Tennessee, educated at Yale ('34) and was a 
Rhodes Scholar. He is noted for his success as the lead manager ofthe Templeton Growth Fund. 
9 Outstanding Investor Digest Homepage 
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paper to outline such a model whereby students can benefit from a streamlined collection 
of insight from Warren Buffett, arguably the world's most successful investor. 
The information presented within should be beneficial to anyone interested in 
learning more about investing. However, this paper was written for the specific purpose 
of introducing the new members of the Tennessee Valley Authority Investment 
Challenge team to the overall philosophy and strategy that has allowed the University of 
Tennessee to claim both the 2001 one-year and three-year investment performance 
championships. Therefore, topics that do not apply to the TV AlC portfolio performance, 
taxes for example, have been omitted from this text. In short, this paper should benefit 
beginning investors, but should not be considered a primary reference. 
Before engaging in investing you should have a healthy respect for study and 
discipline, the prerequisites for success. If you find that you have neither the time nor the 
discipline required for implementing our investment model, you should consider a dollar-
cost-averaging approach to index fund investing. Consistently investing in a low-fee 
index fund, say Vanguard's Total Stock Market Index Fund, requires minimal effort and 
will allow you to out-perform most investment professionals over an investment lifetime. 
In reference to this strategy, Buffett counsels, "Paradoxically, when 'dumb' money 
acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb."lo 
The remainder of the text will outline the TV AlC investment philosophy, 
introduce the screening, information gathering, and valuation techniques used during 
implementation, and submit case examples of actual buy and sell decisions. 
10 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1993 Annual Report, p. 15. 
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An Explanation of the TVA Investment Challenge Program 
In 1996 the TV A Board established the Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Fund to 
meet the financial obligations of decommissioning the corporation's nuclear units. As of 
November 30,2000, the fund totaled $760 million. 
As part of the process of diversifying the financial management of the Trust Fund, 
the corporation allocated $1.9 million to create the TVA Investment Challenge Program. 
This program, which represents an innovative partnership with 19 public universities in 
the Tennessee Valley region, gives students real-world experience in investment 
management. 
Each of the 19 universities that participate in the Investment Challenge sets up a 
program for the management of a $100,000 portfolio. Under a faculty member's 
guidance, the students devise long-term strategies for the portfolios, manage the funds, 
and provide regular performance reports to TVA. Annual awards are presented to the 
schools whose portfolios generate the best returns. 
The Investment Challenge is an important part of TV A's economic development 
mission. It nurtures the educational infrastructure that is vital to the Valley's continued 
growth, and it provides invaluable training for the future business leaders of the region. 11 
TV Ale Guidelines Governing Portfolio Decisions 
11 This explanation and further details ofthe TVAIC can be found at \"ww.tva.com. 
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The investment goal of the portfolio is to provide TVA with a strategic "core-
oriented" allocation to the overall domestic equity market. Manager has been selected by 
TV A as portfolio manager of this strategic allocation. Manager's assignment is to 
construct and actively manage the portfolio in a manner consistent with this investment 
goal and to add value relative to return opportunities that could be achieved from a 
passive exposure to this market segment. The assets of the portfolio are tax-exempt. 
Objective 
The investment objective of the portfolio is to achieve long-term capital growth by 
investing in marketable U.S. common stocks with a risk profile that is similar to the risk 
profile of the market benchmark. Specific investment objectives are intended to define 
quantifiable measures by which the results of the portfolio will be measured and 
evaluated on an ongoing basis. The performance results and investment characteristics of 
the portfolio will be measured and evaluated relative to an overall measure of the large 
stock segment domestic equity market, a universe of other professionally managed core-
oriented equity managers and other universities managing TVA decommissioning funds 
(together with Manger, hereafter "University Mangers"). The universe of other 
professionally managed accounts is defined as the Wilshire Large Core Equity Universe. 
Therefore, the portfolio should strive to meet or exceed the following performance 
objectives: 
• Generate a total return in excess of the S&P 500 Index over a one-to three-year 
horizon. 
11 
• Generate a total return that ranks in the top 50% of the Wilshire Large Core 
Equity Manager Universe. 
• Generate a total return that ranks in the top 15% of the University Manger 
Universe over a one-to three-year horizon. 
Guidelines 
The following points highlight the investment guidelines that have been established 
for the portfolio. Manger is expected to follow these guidelines carefully while 
implementing and executing the portfolio strategy. 
• Asset Allocation 
The portfolio is expected to be invested exclusively in U.S. listed equity 
securities. Any cash equivalent investment should represent "frictional" or 
operational amounts and not strategic allocations. Therefore, cash equivalents 
should not exceed 5% of the portfolio at any time. Should market conditions 
suggest a hostile environment where this guideline may be detrimental to the 
financial well being of TV A, Manager should communicate suggested tactical 
adjustments to this guideline with authorized representatives of TVA. Cash 
equivalent balances are expected to be invested in a short-term investment fund 
managed by the assigned custodian bank. 
• Diversification 
Portfolio performance is expected to achieve value added results through active 
management decisions. However, the portfolio is expected to be diversified with 
12 
respect to the exposures to economic sectors, industries, and individual stocks. 
The following diversification guidelines apply to the construction of the portfolio: 
o The maximum allocation to any economic sector (sectors will be defined 
by Wilshire Associates Incorporated) is 40% of portfolio assets. As of 
September 30, 1997, the economic sector weightings for the S&P 500 
Index were as follows: 
• Capital Goods 5% 
• Consumer Durables 2% 
• Consumer Non-Durables 31% 
• Energy 10% 
• Finance 16% 
• Materials & Services 8% 
• Technology 18% 
• Transportation 1% 
• Utilities 9% 
o No single issue should exceed 10% (at market value) of the portfolio. Ifan 
issue exceeds the 10% allocation guideline, the manger will have one 
calendar quarter to rebalance the portfolio to meet this guideline 
o The portfolio is expected to be constructed with a minimum of 15 
individual stocks. 
• Market Capitalization 
The majority of the portfolio is expected to primarily be invested in well 
established, large market capitalization companies. The portfolio may also invest 
in less established, small capitalization companies. However, based on the 
strategic role of this portfolio in the context of the overall investment program, no 
more than 35% of the portfolio may be invested in small capitalization 
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companies. For this purpose, small capitalization is defined as companies with a 
market capitalization of less than $1 billion. Companies with a market 
capitalization below $100 million in market capitalization after purchase shall be 
reported to TVA and monitored carefully. The portfolio shall not have more than 
5% invested in securities that have drifted below $100 million. 
• Other Transactions and Policies 
o American Depositary Receipts ("ADR's") may be used to construct the 
portfolio. However, because of the strategic role of the portfolio, positions 
in stocks traded as ADR's are limited to no more than 15% of the portfolio 
market value. The 15% limitation includes foreign securities traded on 
u.s. Exchanges that are not ADR's. 
o Prohibited Transactions - The portfolio is prohibited from investing in any 
of the following investment vehicles or activities unless approved by an 
authorized representative of TVA: Any securities issued by an investor 
owned electric utility or independent power producers; Fixed income 
securities; Non-marketable securities (including private debt securities 
and/or direct placements); Non-dollar denominated securities; 
Commingled funds (including mutual funds); Convertible or preferred 
securities; Warrants; Commodities; Real estate investments (Including 
Real Estate Investment Trusts); Short sales; Margin purchases; Swaps 
(index or rate of return) and Securities lending 
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o Derivatives Policy - Manager is not authorized to use derivative securities 
(defined as options and futures). More specially, Manager is prohibited 
from using any form of derivative security that effectively leverages the 
portfolio. 
How to Judge Investment Performance 
For Long-Term Investors, owning an index fund that tracks the S&P will produce 
reasonably satisfactory results over time. Therefore, any small advantages annually over 
the index must be rewarding. Buffett has managed to beat the S&P index in all but four of 
the last thirty-six years averaging an annual margin of 11.6%. His Average Annual Gain 
During the same period of 22.6% versus an 11 % gain by the S&P is truly remarkable in 
h . C: • 12 t e mvestment prolesSlOn. 
Here is Buffett on judging investment performance: "Any investor can chalk up 
large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull market, one must avoid the 
error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that 
its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead 
compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.,,13 
Buffett's extraordinary relative performance is even more impressive if one 
factors in that the S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas Berkshire's numbers are after-
tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and 
accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when 
12 See Berkshire's Corporate Performance VS. the S&P 55, Appendix Table I 
13 Warren Buffett, 1997 Chairman' s Letter, p.1. 
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that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the 
index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the 
aggregate lag to be substantial. 
Utilizing Buffett's investment strategy the TV AIe team has outperformed the S&P 
500 in every year of its existence. In 2001, the fund earned a positive 24 % return 
compared to the S&P return of a negative 11.9%. Over the last three years the fund 
returned a positive 73% while the S&P returned a negative 3%. These returns beat all of 
the nineteen universities in the contest and the majority of money managers. We have 
even outpaced Buffett's performance over the last three years, although this is not a fair 
comparison. The huge capital base Buffett is working with serves an anchoring effect on 
returns: "The size of our equity capital ... makes it certain that we cannot maintain our 
past rate of gain, or for that matter, come close to doing SO.,,14 
TV Ale Investment Philosophy 
The investment management principles practiced by the TV AlC Portfolio 
Managers derive from the work of the late Benjamin Graham, professor of investments at 
Columbia Business School and author of Security Analysis and The Intelligent Investor 
and Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway and student of Graham. Our team seeks 
to appraise the worth of a company, what Graham called "intrinsic value," by determining 
the present-value estimate of the cash that can be taken out ofa business during its 
remaining life. 
14 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1991 Annual Report, p. 1. 
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Investments are made at a significant discount to intrinsic value, normally 40% to 
50%, which Graham called an investor's "margin of safety." In the Appendix to Graham's 
The Intelligent Investor, Buffett offers an illustration of this concept: 
You ... have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate 
about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is 
what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don't try and buy 
businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous 
margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you 
only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in 
investing. (Emphasis added.) 
The importance of having an "enormous" margin of safety is directly correlated to the 
impossibility of telling the future. We would be wise to note the observation of Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr.: "We humans are simply not much good at foretelling the future." 15 In 
fact, Buffett compares those who attempt to predict stock market earnings and growth 
prospects to fortunetellers: "We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to 
make fortune tellers look good."16 
A study conducted by Patricia M. Dechow and Richard G. Sloan, titled Returns to 
Contrarian Investment Strategies: Tests of NaIve Expectations Hypotheses17, illustrates 
the difficulty of forecasting future results. The study compares analysts' forecasts offive-
year earnings per share growth rates to the actual rate of e. p. s. growth attained over the 
five years subsequent to the date of the forecast. The sample consists of23,203 firm-
years between 1981-1992 for firms that had analysts' forecasts of five year e. p. s. growth 
IS Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Futility of Futurism, The Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1977, p. 16. 
16 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1992 Annual Report, p. 2 
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available on IIBIEIS, were traded on the NYSE, ASE, or NASDAQ, and were covered by 
Compustat. 
Can Analysts Predict E.P.S. Growth Over the Next 5 Years? 
Companies Ranked on Analysts' Consensus Estimate of E.P.S. Growth Rate 
over the Next Five Years, 1981-1992 
Low High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Analysts' Consensus 4.1% 8.3% 10.1% 11.6% 12.9% 14.8% 16.2% 19.3% 23.3% 36.2% 
Estimate of Earnings 
per share Growth 
Rate 
over the next five 
years 
Actual Growth Rate 
of -0.9 5.2 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.2 7.8 6.7 13.4 
Earnings per share 
over 
the next 5 years 
The above results indicate that investment analysts have been unable to predict 
actual growth rate of earnings per share for the next five years. The analysts' five-year 
earnings per share forecasts, on average, were significantly above the actual rate of e.p.s. 
growth rate that occurred over the next five years. Furthermore, the most optimistic five-
year e.p.s. growth rate forecasts were also the most inaccurate. 
Studies like this one lend credibility to Buffett's assertion that using precise 
numbers is foolish. Therefore, we use a range of conservative numbers in our 
assumptions. This strategy ensures that we err on the side of omission rather than 
commission, an approach that limits our exposure to earnings disappointments. Our 
experience aligns with Buffett's: "Usually, the range must be so wide that no useful 
conclusion can be reached. Occasionally, though, even very conservative estimates about 
the future emergence of birds (dollars) reveal that the price quoted is startlingly low in 
17 Journal of Financial Economics 43, 1997. 
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relation to value.,,18 The importance of being conservative can not be overstated. An 
investor can often be impressed by an analysts "calculated" estimates, but he should not 
forget the business fundamentals that must exist to drive the numbers. In fact, Buffett is 
willing to wager a substantial sum on the likelihood "that fewer than 10 of the 200 most 
profitable companies in 2000 will attain 15% annual growth in earnings-per-share over 
the next 20 years.,,19 
In order to be sure that our predictions are conservative, we limit our purchase 
decisions to companies that are easy to understand. The more confidence we have in the 
assumptions we apply in calculating a company's intrinsic value, the more precisely we 
can estimate what the company is worth. Buffett puts it this way "A fast-changing 
industry environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the certainty 
we secl<:.,,20 Our inability to understand fast changing technology companies, for instance, 
has precluded our purchasing any meaningful amount of shares of stock in this sector. 
A cross-section of the businesses Berkshire has part or whole ownership of should 
allow the reader greater insight into what types of businesses one should consider for 
study. An introduction to these businesses will help you identify a range of industries 
from which you can develop your circle of competence. Obviously, Buffett has 
considerable expertise in Insurance, as this is Berkshire's primary business conducted 
through a number of subsidiaries, among them GEICO and General Re Corporation. 
Furthermore, Buffett possesses considerable expertise in a diverse number of business 
activities. 
18 Warren Buffett, 2000 Annual Report, p. 13 
19 Warren Buffett, 2000 Annual Report, p. 18. 
20 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1996 Annual Report, p. 14. 
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The following businesses were reported as Berkshire holdings in the Berkshire 
Hathaway 2001 Annual Report (All %'s are in terms the outstanding capital stock.): 11% 
of American Express Company, 8% of The Coca Cola Company, 9% The Gillette 
Company, 9% ofH&R Block, 15% of Moody's Corporation, 18% of The Washington 
Post Company, and 3% of Wells Fargo and Company. Wholly owned subsidiaries 
include: Flight Safety International (provides training of aircraft and ship operators), 
Executive Jet (provides fractional ownership of general aviation craft), Nebraska 
Furniture Mart (home furniture retailer), Buffalo News (daily and Sunday newspaper 
publisher), See's Candies (manufacturer and seller of boxed chocolates), RR Brown 
(manufacturer and distributor of footwear), International Dairy Queen (6000 stores 
offering prepared dairy treats, food, and other snacks), Acme Building Brands (a 
manufacturer of face brick and concrete masonry products), etc. 
You get the point. Buffett's circle of competence is large in scope, but the 
businesses that lie within it produce very tangible and understandable products. Their 
business models are focused. As such, their managers avoid distractions and focus on 
widening defendable economic moats. The TV AlC team seeks to add to its holdings, 
companies that we feel possess these similar types of qualifications. 
Businesses that have been identified to possess certain metrics (discussed below) 
that are leading indicators of value merit our attention. If we discover that they are easily 
understood and that they offer good predictability, they are valued. If the valuation 
implies a large margin of safety, the company's competitors are valued. This process 
allows us to do a comparative analysis whereby we rank the companies according to the 
margin of safety each affords. 
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It is important to remember that companies do not operate in a vacuum. One 
company's gain is often another company's loss. Therefore, comparative analysis should 
always be applied to ensure that the purchase of the most undervalued company in the 
industry. Theoretically, this issue must also provide the highest rate of return of its peers. 
This sounds simple enough. However, due to the complexity and diversification of many 
businesses across several industries, identifying competitors for comparative analysis can 
be challenging. 
As difficult as this process can be, it is critical to demonstrate patience. Keep in 
mind that Buffett can identify only a few "Inevitables,,,21 even after a "lifetime oflooking 
for them." He considers Gillette and Coca-Cola to be in this category. These easily 
understood businesses possess durable competitive advantages that give their products 
and services a "wide, sustainable moat." Thus, the intrinsic values of Gillette and Coca-
Cola have to be adjusted for the value added to the concern by the fortified predictability 
of earnings growth provided by the company's protective moat. Likewise, our 
comparative analysis calculations have to be adjusted for the qualitative information that 
drives the financial numbers. Predictable long-term growth is a by-product of a 
sustainable competitive edge. Unfortunately, there are only a few Inevitables; therefore, 
we spend a great deal oftime trying to locate and purchase the "Highly Probables." 
We are firm believers in Warren Buffett's assertion that if you are a "know-
something" investor concentration reduces risk and increases return: "The strategy we've 
adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would 
therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional 
investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well 
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decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor thinks 
about a business and the comfort-level he must feel about its economic characteristics 
b fi b 
. . . ,,22 
e ore uymg mto It. 
While we take into account sector and industry prospects in our valuation, our 
transaction decisions are not affected by the weight of a sector in our portfolio. Rather 
than analyze how a transaction will affect our portfolio's sector weightings, we believe 
the time is better spent analyzing how a transaction will affect our portfolio's rate of 
return. Furthermore, we believe this rate of return will be substantially increased by 
concentration. 
Thus, our top ten holdings have a substantial impact on our portfolio's return. 
This strategy allows us to decrease the time spent wading through marginal transaction 
decisions, and increase the time spent scrutinizing major transaction decisions. We would 
note the insight offered by Mr. Buffett on this point: "Charlie and I decided long ago that 
in an investment lifetime, it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions ... 
Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that 
- only a very few times. ,,23 At year end 200 I and 2000, over 70% of the total fair value of 
Berkshire Hathaway's investments in equities was concentrated in four investees. 
Like the Saint Bernard that searches for life in a cold and treacherous terrain, we 
are constantly traversing the perilous areas of the market in search for distressed 
companies. Once discovered, we utilize the checklist below to check for an economic 
pulse and sustainable vital signs. Many of our trips are in vain; we find that the company 
is too ill, and an attempt to cling to it might put both our lives in danger. However, there 
21 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1996 Annual Report, p. 14. 
22 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1993 Annual Report, p. 12 
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are a few occasions upon which we find the company is not in any real danger; rather, it 
is wandering alone and misunderstood. We rejoice in our discovery, for we know, unlike 
the Saint Bernard, our reward is far greater than doggy bones. 
The terrain we traverse becomes extremely harsh when particularly inclement 
weather prevails in the market. We see this as an opportunity to demonstrate the courage 
that our training has instilled and to perform the duty our employer requires. A gyrating 
stock market increases the number of lost and misunderstood cases. A depressed market 
increases the frequency of these cases, and allows us to perform more rescues. It has been 
our experience that not too long after returning home, the weather clears; the sun comes 
out; and our rescues have substantially increased our pile of doggy bones. 
How then do we know when the market has turned south? Sir John Templeton 
says the time to be most courageous is that point when the "gloom is so thick you can cut 
it with a knife." It is at the point of maximum pessimism that we find our foremost 
opportunities to exploit Mr. Market. Graham explains that sometimes Mr. Market's prices 
will be ridiculously high and sometimes ridiculously low. Often they will be roughly 
justified by the business outlook. Therefore, it is wise to form independent stock 
valuations, and exploit the accommodating Mr. Market when the opportunity arises: 
If you are a prudent investor or a sensible businessman, will you let Mr. Market's 
daily communication determine your view of the value of a $1,000 interest in an 
enterprise? Only in case you agree with him, or in case you want to trade with 
him. You may be happy to sell out to him when he quotes you a ridiculously high 
price, and equally happy to buy from him when his price is low. But the rest of 
the time you will be wiser to form your own ideas of the value of your holdings, 
23 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1993 Annual Report, p. 12 
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based on full reports from the company about its operations and financial 
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posItIon 
We price securities, so we can be ready to take advantage of what Buffett refers to as an 
"alcoholic, manic depressive, and mentally ill" Mr. Market. 
While the "Margin of Safety" principle is the cornerstone of our investment 
requirements, we look for a number of metrics that signal that an investment opportunity 
is waiting to be discovered. Most investments in our portfolio have one or more of the 
following investment characteristics: low stock price in relation to tangible book value, 
shares selling at a discount to net current assets, low price-to-earnings ratio, low 
corporate leverage, purchases of a company's own stock by the company's officers and 
directors, a stock price which has declined significantly from its previous high price, 
company share repurchases, small market capitalization, a high average return on equity, 
and/or good management. Academic research and studies (many of which are included 
for your study in the Appendix) have indicated a historical, statistical correlation between 
each of these investment characteristics and above average investment rates of return 
over long measurement periods. 
Taking the Economic Pulse - Employing a Value Checklist 
In much the same way the Saint Bernard searches for signs and smells that lead it 
to find lost persons, an investor should take an investigative approach to discovering the 
24 Benjamin Graham, Intelligent Investor, 4th ed., Harper & Row., 1973 p. 108. 
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clues that expose an undervalued issue. The checklist, which follows, acts as a screening 
tool for identifying leads25 : 
1. Low Price in Relation to Tangible Book Value Stocks priced at less than 
tangible book value are purchased on the assumption that, in time, their market price will 
reflect at least their stated book value; i.e., what the company itself has paid for its own 
assets. Stocks selling at low prices in relation to tangible book value are often priced at 
significant discounts to the value that shareholders would receive in a sale of the entire 
company.26 
2. Stocks Selling at Discounts to Net Current Assets (i.e., cash and other assets 
which can be turned into cash within one year, such as accounts receivable and inventory, 
less all liabilities), a measure of the estimated liquidation value of the business. Net 
current asset value ascribes no value to a company's real estate and equipment, nor is any 
going concern value ascribed to prospective earning power from a company's sales base. 
When liquidation value appraisals are made, the estimated "haircut" on accounts 
receivable and inventory is often recouped or exceeded by the estimated value of a 
company's real estate and equipment. 27 
This stock selection technique was successfully employed by Graham. His 
criterion calls for the purchase of stocks that are priced at 66% or less of a company's 
25 The checklist included is a combination of metrics used by the TV AIC team, the majority of which are 
explained in more detail in a publication produced by Tweedy, Browne Company LLC titled What Has 
Worked In Investing: Studies of Investment Approaches and Characteristics Associated with Exceptional 
Returns, 1992. We encourage all TV AlC members to read this study, for the academic studies of the 
investment characteristics explained in this booklet, which are "value" oriented characteristics, demonstrate 
empirical evidence for Buffett's beliefthat the investors who follow Graham's teachings can consistently 
beat the averages. 
26 See Roger Ibbotson Study, Appendix Table II 
27 See Tweedy, Browne Study, Appendix Table III 
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underlying current assets net of all liabilities and claims senior to a company's common 
stock (current liabilities, long-term debt, preferred stock, unfunded pension liabilities). 
F or example, if a company's current assets are $100 per share and the sum of its current 
liabilities, long-term debt, preferred stock, and unfunded pension liabilities is $40 per 
share, then net current assets would be $60 per share, and Graham would pay no more 
than 66% of $60, or $40, for this stock. 
Graham used the net current asset investment selection technique extensively in 
the operations of his investment management business, Graham-Newman Corporation, 
through 1956. Graham reported that the average return, over a 30-year period, on 
diversified portfolios of net current asset stocks was about 20% per year. 28 Graham's 
commentary should highlight the logic and simplicity of this technique: "It always 
seemed, and still seems, ridiculously simple to say that if one can acquire a diversified 
group of common stocks at a price less than the applicable net current assets alone - after 
deducting all prior claims, and counting as zero the fixed and other assets - the results 
should be quite satisfactory. ,,29 
3. Low Price in Relation to Earnings Stocks bought at low price earnings ratios 
afford higher earnings yields than stocks bought at higher ratios of price to earnings. The 
earnings yield is the yield that shareholders would receive if all the earnings were paid 
out as a dividend. Benjamin Graham recommended the purchase of securities of 
companies in which the earnings yield (i.e, the reciprocal of the price/earnings ratio) was 
at least twice the AAA bond yield, and the company's total debt (i.e., current liabilities 
28 What Has Worked In Investing, p.8. 
29 Benjamin Graham, Intelligent Investor, 4th ed .. Harper & Row., 1973. 
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and long-term debt) was less than its book value. Graham also advised that each security 
which met the selection criteria be held for either two years or, or until 50% price 
appreciation occurred, whichever came first 30 
Investing in stocks that are priced low in relation to earnings does not preclude 
investments in companies whose earnings are expected to grow in the future. To 
paraphrase Warren Buffett, "value" and "growth" are joined at the hip. A company priced 
low in relation to earnings, whose earnings are not expected to grow, is preferable to a 
similarly priced company whose earnings are not expected to grow. Price is key. 
Included within this broad low price in relation to earnings category are high dividend 
yields. Stocks of companies selling at low price/earnings ratios often have above average 
cash dividend yields. Additionally, the remaining part of earnings after the payment of 
cash dividends, i.e., retained earnings, are reinvested in the business for the benefit of 
shareholders. Retained earnings increase the net assets, or stockholders' equity, of a 
company. The increase in stockholder's equity from retained earnings often equates to a 
specific increase in the true corporate value of a company, especially when the retained 
earnings result in a similar increase in a company's cash or a decrease in its debt. 
Reinvestment of retained earnings in business assets and projects that earn high returns 
can increase true corporate value by amounts exceeding the actual retained earnings. A 
company with a low price/earnings ratio, by definition, must provide the investor with 
either an above average cash dividend yield, or an above average retained earnings yield, 
or both. 
30 See Henry Oppenheimer's Study, Appendix Table IV 
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4. Low Corporate Leverage Our objection to debt is directly correlated to our 
extreme aversion to risk. Betting heavily on companies that have been punished by the 
market can produce significant rewards; however, a company that has taken on a 
burdensome debt load will be most instable during times of distress. One of the effects of 
a highly leveraged capital structure is to make the current market value of the company 
largely unpredictable. We will not knowingly purchase an issue where the debt burden 
could jeopardize solvency. 
5. A Significant Pattern of Purchases by One or More Insiders (Officers and 
Directors Officers, directors and large shareholders often buy their own company's 
stock when it is depressed in relation to the current value which would be ascribable to 
the company's assets or its ongoing business in a corporate acquisition, or to the likely 
value of the company in near or intermediate future. Insiders often have "insight 
information:" knowledge about new marketing programs, product price increases, cost 
cuts, increased order rates, changes in industry conditions, etc., which they believe will 
result in an increase in the true knowledge of "hidden assets," such as the value of a 
money-losing subsidiary which a competitor may have offered to buy, or knowledge of 
the likely earning power of the company once heavy non-recurring new product 
development costs stop. It is not uncommon to see significant insider buying in 
companies selling in the stock market at low price/earnings ratios or at low prices in 
relation to book value. Frequently, companies in which we have invested have also 
purchased their own shares in the open market. 
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6. Company Share Repurchases In "Beating the Market by Buying Back Stock,,,3l 
Carol Loomis examined the investment returns from a strategy of buying the stock of 
companies that have repurchased significant amounts of their own common stock. The 
study screened I ,660 stocks in the Value Line Investment Survey and selected all 
companies that had purchased significant amounts of their own shares in the 10-year 
period from 1974 through 1983. (Companies that had purchased a large quantity of stock 
to eliminate a shareholder who had threatened a takeover were eliminated from the 
sample.) Investments were assumed to have been made on the approximate date of each 
stock repurchase. The total investment return was measured from each of these dates to 
the end of 1984, producing a 22.6% average compounded rate of return. The comparable 
return of the S&P 500 was 14.1 %. Buffett offers an explanation for the results of this 
study: 
When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares, the company 
increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to be the most valuable 
franchise in the world ... Instead of repurchasing stock, Coca-Cola could pay those 
funds to us in dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares. 
That would be a less efficient scenario: Because of taxes we would pay on 
dividend income, we would not be able to increase our proportionate ownership to 
the degree that Coke can, acting for US. 32 
7. A Significant Decline in a Stock's Price A decline in price is often accompanied by a 
decline in earnings or an earnings disappointment. Reversion to the mean is almost a law 
31 Carol Loomis. Fortune, "Beating the Market by Buying Back Stock", April 29 1985. 
n ' 
Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1990 Annual Report, p. 4. 
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of nature with respect to company performance. We have found that, more often than not, 
good companies with able management, whose recent performance has been poor, tend to 
perk up and improve. 
8. Small Market Capitalization Most publicly traded companies are small in terms 
of their market capitalization. The sheer volume of these companies precludes a great 
number of them from the intense scrutiny that very often keeps larger capitalized 
companies efficiently valued. Thus, a great number of these companies are neglected 
proper valuation recognition for longer periods of time. 33 
9. A High Average Return On Equity (ROE) Over a Long Stretch of Time In 
discussing the earnings (and intrinsic value) growth prospects of a business (or of the 
S&P 500), Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, and Bill Ruane34 have frequently mentioned 
the potential of a company to reinvest retained cash earnings in the company's operating 
business and earn high rates of return on this additional investment. A high average ROE 
over a long stretch of time, such as ten years, conveys information about the nature of a 
business and suggests that the business enjoys some kind of competitive advantage, often 
from lower costs, uniqueness, or differentiation, that has enabled the business to sustain 
high returns. 35 
33 See Rolf Banz's Study, Appendix Table V 
34 Bill Ruane was a student of Graham's, principle of the Sequoia Fund, and the only investment manager 
Buffett ever recommended to his partners upon dissolving Buffett Partnerships. 
35 Great 10-Year Record = Great Future Right?, p. I. 
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10. Good Management We require management be shareholder friendly. If 
management has a significant stake in the business, then we feel much more comfortable 
about our partnership with them. Of course, there is no management as friendly as 
Berkshire Hathaway's. If management has a reasonable compensation package and a 
robust equity stake in the business chances are their interests are aligned with shareholder 
interest. (Munger has a 90% of his net worth tied up in Berkshire and Buffett has 99% of 
his.) 
How to Think About Markets 
At the Financial Management Association's 2002 Annual Meeting, Mr. Buffett 
was asked what his class would be like if he were the teacher. He responded that he 
would teach two concepts. First, he would teach his students how to value companies. 
Secondly, he would teach students how to think about markets. 
Investors should take notice when the "Oracle of Omaha" becomes uncomfortable 
with overall market valuations. It is no small thing that Buffett was a net seller of stocks 
in 2000, and in each of the four years before as well. This retreat fits his well-known 
opinion that future returns from stocks can't begin to match those that investors earned in 
the 1980s and '90s. 36 
He almost never talks publicly about stock market levels in his annual reports or 
speeches. Furthermore, he disdains political and economic forecasts: "Even now, Charlie 
and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept 
locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in 
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the market like children.,,37 He is in good company, for Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-
winning University of Chicago economist, published a Business Week article prior to the 
1989 recession warning" ... we economists cannot predict business cycles very well.,,38 
However, in each of the last three years Buffett has granted the public insight into 
his approach to thinking about the long-term yield on common stocks. Carol Loomis of 
Fortune magazine captured his thoughts in 1999 and 2001 in articles titled "Mr. Buffett 
on the Stock Market" and "Warren Buffett on the Stock Market," respectively. In 
addition to these articles, Buffett used his 2000 Chairman's Letter (page 14) to express 
his concern for the "irrational exuberance" being demonstrated in the marketplace. Each 
of these sources provides invaluable information on how to think about markets. Their 
aggregate is too lengthy to be included; however, Dr. Auxier does a masterful job 
distilling the major points in his "Investments Material." I have combined his comments 
on the 1999 article (the majority of the text which follows) with my observations on the 
2001 article: 39 
Synopsis of "Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market" 
The gist of this article (1999) is Buffett's argument that the next 17 years' 
performance in the stock market isn't likely to be good, probably averaging only about 
6% per annum. In short, the stock market is overvalued now - selling way too high ... 
36 Carol Loomis, Fortune, "The Value Machine," Feb. 19,2001. 
37 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1992 Annual Report, p. 2. 
38 Gary S. Becker, Business Week, "How Bad Will the Downturn Be? Flip a Coin." April 10, 1989. 
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Seventeen Years Ending Dec. 31, 1981. First Buffett examines the stock market's 
performance over the 17 years ending in Dec. 31, 1981. From Dec.31, 1964 to Dec. 31, 
1981, the market rose from 874.12 to 875.00. In short, the market went nowhere for 17 
years; it's important to understand why. 
You would think that business surely must have been bad over this period for the stock 
market to have performed so poorly. This wasn't the case; it was Wall Street that was 
sick, not Main Street. GDP almost quintupled, rising by 370%. In short, business 
performed very well over this time frame - significantly better in fact than during the 
following 17 years when the market performed so well. Then why did the market perform 
so badly? 
(1) Interest rates. Here is Buffett, "In economics, interest rates acts as gravity behaves in 
the physical wold. At all times, in all markets, in all parts of the world, the tiniest 
change in rates changes the value of every financial asset." Interest rates on long-term 
government bonds rose from a little over 4% to more than 15%. This had a 
tremendous negative impact on both stock and bond prices. Why did interest rates 
climb so high? 
(2) Poor Corporate Profitability. After-tax corporate profits as a percent of GDP 
generally range from 4% to 6.5%. By 1982, profits had fallen to 3.5% ofGDP The 
Federal Reserve was trying to break the back of inflation, and as Buffett says, Fed 
39 Dr. Al Auxier's summary of Carol Loomis' 1999 article, "Mr. Buffett on the Stock Market," can be read 
in its entirety in his "Investments Material," pages 44-47. The included commentary on this article is 
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Chairman Paul Volker took a two-by-four to the economy to do it. This brought on a 
recession and poor corporate profitability. 
(3) Investor Psychology. Investors have a bad habit of projecting the past into the future 
when they ought to know better. Here's Buffett: "And is so typical, investors 
projected out into the future what they were seeing. That's their unshakable habit: 
looking into the rear-view mirror instead of through the windshield." If you're to be 
successful investing, you've got to break this habit. And yet it's tough to do because 
often your best prediction is no change ... 
Seventeen Years Ending Dec. 31, 1998. From Dec. 31, 1981 to Dec. 31, 1998 the Dow 
went from 875 to 9,181. This 17-year period was the finest market performance in U.S. 
history, better even than if you had bought in the depths of the Great Depression. 
Looking at the three factors determining stock market performance, we find: 
(1) Interest rates. Interest rates fell from more than 15% on the U.S. government long 
bond to 5%. 
(2) Corporate Profitability. Corporate profitability had increased dramatically, rising 
from about 3.5% ofGDP to about 6.5%. 
(3) Investor Psychology. The greatest bull market in U.S. history had produced great 
euphoria among investors. According to their "unshakable habit," investors were 
almost entirely taken from this work. 
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looking into the rear-view mirror instead of through the windshield ... Buffett puts it 
this way: "Once a bull market gets under way, and once you reach the point where 
everybody has made money no matter what system he or she follows, a crowd is 
attracted into the game that is responding not to interest rates and profits but simply to 
the fact that it seems a mistake to be out of stocks. In effect, these people superimpose 
an I-can't-miss-the-party factor on top of fundamental factors that drive the market." 
What's Necessary for Juicy Profits Over the Next Ten or 17 or 20 Years; One or more of 
the following must occur: 
(1) "Interest Rates Must Fall Further." A fall to 3% would nearly double stock prices 
Buffett argues. 
(2) "Corporate Profitability in Relation to GDP Must rise." Buffett doesn't think this 
is likely, but keep in mind that those investors who feel strongly that we're in a new 
economy believe that corporate earnings will grow nicely. In great stock market booms, 
most investors always believe that there is an important departure from the past that 
makes stocks worth much more. In the great bull market of the 1920s, for example, the 
airplane, automobile, and radio were thought to have created a new era ... And of course 
the economy was on the dawn of a new era, but it was the Great Depression, not a new-
found prosperity. 
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(3) You've Got to Be a Good Stock Picker. Here Buffett emphasizes how tough it was 
to pick the winners in the "new era" economy. For example, early in the 20th century, 
there were maybe 2,000 automobile manufacturers, and even though autos had a 
tremendous impact on the new economy, it was difficult for investors to pick the winners. 
And he makes a similar comparison for airplane makers, airlines, and other industries 
which greatly impacted the economy, but generally didn't profit investors ... The 
important lesson Buffett draws from this: "The key to successful investing is not 
assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but 
rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the 
durability of that advantage. The products or services that have wide, sustainable moats 
around them are the ones that deliver rewards to investors." 
Buffett spells out why stocks over the next ten or 17 or 20 years will probably only 
earn about 6% per annum on average. First, real growth in the economy will only 
average about 3% per annum, which Buffett says "is pretty darn good." Since after-tax 
corporate profits as a percentage of GDP is at the upper range of about 6%, profits also 
will grow at about 3% real plus 2% inflation plus about one percent for dividend yield, or 
a total of 6% per annum. (Buffett says that "you have to be wildly optimistic to believe 
that corporate profits as a percentage of GDP can, for any sustained period, hold much 
above 6%.") 
Additional Thoughts Expressed in "Warren Buffett on the Stock Market" 
36 
The ideas expressed in the 200 1 article parallel the thoughts explained above. 
There are two notable additions. First, Buffett changes his expectation for long-term 
returns on equities over the next decade or two from 6% to 7%. Here is an explanation of 
his logic: First, real growth in the economy will only average about 3% per annum, which 
Buffett says "is pretty darn good." Since after-tax corporate profits as a percentage of 
GDP is at the upper range of about 6%, profits also will grow at about 3% real plus about 
2% inflation plus about one percent for dividend yield, or a total of 6% per annum. Since 
the 1999 article was published, the economy grew as valuations fell; therefore, Buffett 
revised his estimate upward to 7%. 
Secondly, he provides a method for quantifying, tracking, and interpreting the 
factors that determine long-run market performance. He does this by introducing a chart 
that shows the market value of all publicly traded securities as a percentage of the 
country's business - that is, as a percentage of GNP - which he cites as "the best single 
measure of where valuations stand at any given moment." 
Buffett's explanation of the chart included below follows: 
For investors to gain wealth at a rate that exceeds the growth of US. businesses, 
the percentage relationship line on the chart must keep going up and up. If GNP is 
going to grow 5% a year and you want market values to go up 1 0%, then you 
need to have the line go straight off the top of the chart. That won't happen. 
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For me, the message of that chart is this: If the percentage relationship falls to the 
70% or 80% area, buying the stocks is likely to work very well for you. If the 
ratio approaches 200% -- as it did in 1999 and part of 2000 - you are playing with 
fire. As you can see the ratio was recently 133%.40 
The market has been a wild thing 
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The thought process illustrated in these articles allows an investor a quantifiable 
approach for interpreting the long-term impact of economic data. Keep in mind, these 
ideas will not allow you or Buffett to make predictions about what the stock market will 
do in the short-run: "I never have the faintest idea what the stock market is going to do in 
the next six months, or the next year, or the next twO.,,41 However, an understanding of 
the key principals that control and direct the movement of the market will allow you to 
have good predictability of what is likely to happen over the long term: "But I think it is 
40 The chart and its explanation are taken from Carol Loomis, Fortune, "Warren Buffett on the Stock 
Market," December lO, 2001, p. lO. 
41 Carol Loomis, Fortune, "Warren Buffett on the Stock Market," December 10, 2001, p. 7 
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very easy to see what is likely to happen over the long term.,,42 An enterprising student of 
investments will read the above texts entirely, for they quite literally will pay dividends. 
A Note on How to Think About Market Fluctuations 
The above discussion of three seventeen year periods beginning December 31, 
1964 demonstrated the inevitability of stock market fluctuations. Therefore, it is 
important for investors to be mentally prepared for fluctuations by adopting a logical 
mindset. Preparation prevents panic. Buffett illustrates the logic exquisitely: 
A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a 
cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if 
you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, 
should you prefer higher or lower car prices? These questions, of course, answer 
themselves. 
But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five 
years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? 
We plan to be net buyers of equities for many years to come. Therefore, according 
to the logic prescribed above, we rejoice when the prices for "hamburgers" fall We look 
forward to "29 cent Tuesday," for we know that Wednesday McDonalds will be selling 
42 Carol Loomis, Fortune, "Warren Buffett on the Stock Market," December 10,2001, p. 7 
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the same hamburger for 89 cents. Either way, we have to eat. We choose to stock up on 
Tuesdays. 
A Note on the Importance of Patience in an Overvalued Market 
Buffett reminds us that you are just waiting for the "fat pitch," the "no-brainer." 
The difference between being an investor in the batter's box and being a baseball player 
is that if you pass up three strikes you are not called out: 
Under the circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of discipline. In his 
book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he carved the strike zone into 77 cells, 
each the size of a baseball. Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would 
allow him to bat .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of the 
strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for the fat pitch would 
mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the 
minors. 43 
It is difficult and boring to stand in the batter's box for an extended period of time 
without swinging. However, a "good eye" is as rewarding as a powerful swing. The 
TV Ale rules dictating we be 95% invested can make this policy difficult to follow; 
however, our homerun swings, those of concentration, are limited to "fat pitches." 
A Note on Financial Jargon, Annual Reports, and Evaluating Management 
43 Warren Buffett, Chairman's Letter, 1997 Annual Report, p. 3. 
40 
During my summer interning in Equity Research at Bear Stearns (New York 
office), I was inundated with nebulous terms like "Net, Net" and "restructuring." 
Learning to speak Wall Street was the equivalent of mastering a new language. Naturally, 
I sought counsel on terms such as these from an Analyst who had earned my confidence 
and respect. Joe Yurman, a veteran on Wall Street, is a former trader who gave up the 
action of the trading floor for the precision of research. Despite the move, he retained the 
lessons and the "tell it like it is" attitude he acquired during his years on the trading floor. 
His advice reveals much about Wall Street jargon: "Clifford, to understand a company 
you have to listen to everything management tells you .. to value a company, you must 
hear what management did not tell you." 
Fortunately, Buffett does not attempt to speak Wall Street, although he could 
undoubtedly teach a course on it. Rather, he chooses to explain his decisions in the 
language of Joe Public. This is fitting, of course, for shareholder friendly managements to 
do, for most shareholders are of the Joe Public type. Thus, corporate managements and 
the Analysts that follow them would better serve investors if they heeded Larry Bird's 
assertion that: "A good pass is caught pass." 
Fancy jargon will remain an obstacle for investors, for such terms allow the 
author wiggle room. At the 2002 FMA meeting with Mr. Buffett, he explained that he 
skims hundreds and hundreds of annual reports a year. This exercise is beneficial in a 
number of ways. Among them is that by so doing, Buffett has acquired a skill for gaining 
insight into the "unquantifiable" component of a company: management. 
Perhaps, the evaluation of management is Buffett's greatest point of departure 
from the Graham philosophy. Graham states that "Until objective, quantifiable, and 
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reasonably reliable tests of managerial competence are devised and applied, this factor 
will continue to be looked at through a fog.,,44 In contrast, Buffett asserts that having read 
an incalculable number of annual reports, he has acquired a skill for identifying 
managements that have let the Public Relations department have the final say. 
Why, do we include this point? First, you should consider the benefits of 
skimming the annual reports, especially the "Letter to Shareholder's" section, of 
companies that you wish to include in your circle of competence. This practice will allow 
you to add to what Buffett describes as a "cumulative databank" that you can call on for a 
lifetime of investment decisions. As your databank becomes more cumulative, you will 
become more astute at identifying honest and competent management. 
Secondly, you are bound to be asked about the TV AlC strategy by a reporter, 
interviewer, etc. In order to respond intelligently you will undoubtedly have to address 
preconceived notions about the terms "Growth" and "Value" in investing. That is, you 
will have to overcome the temptation to mislead by invoking financial jargon. 
Buffett explains that value and growth are not mutually exclusive terms: "In our 
opinion the two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component in the 
calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible 
to enormous and whose impact can be negative as well as positive. ,,45 
You should be aware that our fund is labeled a "value-fund" due to the metrics 
associated with our investment decisions. However, this distinction is a bit redundant, for 
as Buffett notes: "What is 'investing' if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient 
to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value 
44 Benjamin Graham, Intelligent Investor, 4th ed., Harper & Row., 1973 p. 155. 
45 Warren Buffett. Chairman's Letter, 1992 Annual Report, p. 11. 
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- in hope that it can soon be sold for a still higher price - should be labeled 
speculation ... ,,46 Investing is best when it is simple. Therefore the best investment ideas 
can be explained very simply. According to Buffett, the best investment ideas can be 
explained in a paragraph. 
Thus, it is important that whenever possible you should opt to avoid financial 
jargon, electing instead to explain ideas in the language of Joe Public. Finding clear and 
concise terms for presenting an idea is a rewarding endeavor. A streamlined presentation 
exposes flawed thinking and magnifies the crucial decision factors. 
Implementation 
So, now you have been introduced to our investment philosophy. It seems simple 
enough right? Well, it did until you put the guideline down and tried to find a stock that 
possessed the qualities outlined above. 
I can remember reading Buffett for the first time; I came out of class fired up to 
find that undervalued stock and exploit it. I went barreling through Yahoo Finance 
searching for the characteristics listed above. After several hours of dead ends, I became 
frustrated and turned back to my Buffett guidebook where I was reminded of Charlie 
Munger's assertion that he and Buffett come up with big investment ideas once every 
three years. 
The ideas will come. However, the "fat pitches" are few, and you must be 
prepared to exploit these opportunities when they do arise. Therefore, just as an athlete 
46 Warren Buffett. Chairman's Letter, 1992 Annual Report, p. 11. 
43 
prepares for the next game, you too must adopt a daily routine that will allow you to 
perform when called upon. Buffett describes the information he absorbs as registering in 
a "cumulative databank." Maintaining and expanding this databank ensure that your mind 
will be ready when that great investment idea comes across the plate. 
Many students waste a considerable amount of time trying to identify where to 
acquire information. Once they do find the information source, they often have a great 
deal of trouble deciding what is and is not important. Finding and sorting out the 
important information becomes easier with experience; however, the sources described 
below should help you develop a daily routine for developing a search process for 
undervalued issues. 
Locating Value in the Market 
"So many publications, so little time." The demands of college life can be 
rigorous, and no one expects you to forego a balanced college experience to research 
companies all the time. Therefore, it is important that, when you do elect to spend your 
valuable time exploring investment ideas, you maximize the time spent. 
Investment ideas can be generated a number of ways, but you will increase your 
productivity by implementing an idea screen. An effective screen should allow you to sift 
through the entire market quickly. The screen should identify companies that deserve a 
closer look (i.e. companies possessing the characteristics described earlier). Like a 
pioneer searching for gold, more often than not your screen will catch nothing but rocks. 
However, consistent screening pays off Occasionally, you will expose a gold nugget. 
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The "Market Data" segment of the Wall Street Journal Online is an excellent 
screening tool. You should make it your routine after the market closes each day to print 
off the sections in the Market Data segment entitled "Losers-Top 100," "NYSE 
HighsILows," and "AMEX HighsILows." The themes of these sections align with our 
belief in finding value where the gloom is thickest. Dipping this screen into the market 
will fill your strainer with mud covered rocks. Washing away the mud by checking for 
the metrics described above will reveal that a few of those mud covered rocks are not 
rocks at all. Extensive valuation and research of such discoveries pays off, for sometimes 
such prospecting reveals a precious gem. 
Two other useful sections can be found in the Market Data Segment. First, the 
Insider Trading Spotlight has weekly updates on pertinent information on insider sales 
and purchases such as lists of the industries where insiders have been the most active 
buyers and sellers of stock. Secondly, the Short Interest Highlights section is a good 
indicator of where pessimism can be found in the market. Visiting these sections once a 
week can be productive. 
There is no substitute, of course, for reading. Buffett reveals a great truth about 
investment ideas: "Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive 
appropriation just as good product or business acquisitions are. ,,47 The more you read, the 
more exposure you will have to other people's ideas. It is helpful though, to be reading 
the right people's ideas. 
The Wall Street Journal offers fine insight into the market. It should be 
understood that a daily dose of this publication will greatly enhance your understanding 
of investing and idea generating productivity. Setting aside some time on the weekend to 
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explore Barron's will give you a head-start on the news and ideas you can expect to be 
covered the following week in the WSJ. Finally, take it from Buffett that there is no better 
source for investment insight than the Outstanding Investor Digest: "I'd advise you to 
subscribe. I read each issue religiously. Anyone interested in investing who doesn't 
subscribe is making a big mistake. ,,48 This publication is excellent. 
Lastly, the resourceful investor will implement a screen that will allow him to 
track the ideas and investments of a group he believes to be among the most astute 
investors. By generating a list of the most successful investors, and tracking their moves, 
he will be able to identify overlapping investments and themes. After all, it is just 
common sense to study success. 
This last screen is much more subjective than the screen described above. 
Furthermore, it takes some time to identify the investors that should be included among 
the group to be watched. Unfortunately, many investors worthy of inclusion are quite 
secretive about their investments; therefore, destroying any chance of tracking their 
movements. However, the investor that is willing to build out such a model and 
consistently cross-reference various ideas will benefit greatly over an investment lifetime. 
Confirming You Have Found Value 
It is beneficial to do an initial valuation (described below) to determine that a 
substantial enough margin of safety exists to merit the time and attention further research 
will require. If, in fact, symptoms emblematic of an undervalued issue are discovered, 
47 Warren Buffett, 2001 Annual Report, p. 66. 
48 Outstanding Investor Digest Homepage, Testimonial Section. 
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you should carry forward with your analysis. This process requires that you explore 
primary (SEC Filings including IO-Ks and IO-Qs, Annual Reports, and Conference Calls) 
and secondary information (Computer Databases, Research Reports, and Financial 
Information Services). 
At this stage you are trying to gather the facts. For a given company there will 
inevitably be many stories, proponents, and critics. You must listen to the noise, but hear 
the facts. This difficult task necessitates that you proceed systematically so as to avoid 
attractive but distracting fantasy scenarios and projections touted by those with a vested 
interest in influencing your research. 
Familiarize yourself with the audited financial statements presented in the 
company's SEC filings. These can be downloaded for free from any financial service (i.e. 
Yahoo Finance). The information contained within these filings ideally should be used 
for all of your quantitative financial statement analysis including calculating financial 
ratios and intrinsic value. Using dependable secondary sources for collecting this data 
(i.e. S&P Reports, Value Line Reports), however, saves a great deal oftime. The latter 
method is reasonably reliable, but should not preclude the investor from being familiar 
enough with primary information to recognize glaring incongruities. 
Having familiarized yourself with the company's financial condition via financial 
statement analysis, you are now ready to proceed to an analysis of the qualitative 
information affecting the company. Qualitative analysis requires assessing subjective 
considerations such as management, competitive advantage, industry dynamics, 
demographics, etc. These considerations often reveal advantages or disadvantages of the 
company previously unconsidered in the original intrinsic value calculation. Thus, the 
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intrinsic value must be adjusted to include these considerations (For example, upon 
discovering that a company has exposure to asbestos liability that would materially affect 
the company, an investor should make an adjustment to his assumptions about future 
earnings and/or the discount rate employed to account for the newly discovered risk.). 
Your final intrinsic value calculation will allow you to determine whether the 
company under consideration possesses a healthy enough margin of safety to be 
considered a buy If it is determined that, despite using conservative figures, a substantial 
margin of safety does exist then you should present your analysis and recommendation to 
the group. 
Valuation 
The calculation of intrinsic value is not simple, for as Buffett explains, "intrinsic 
value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that 
must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts offuture cash flows are revised. Two 
people looking at the same set of facts, moreover ... will almost inevitably come up with 
at least slightly different intrinsic value figures.,,49 Students often find the idea of 
calculating a company's intrinsic value to be foreign and, therefore, intimidating. 
However, Buffett explains the idea in a simple analogy that is helpful for relating the 
valuation process 
The oracle was Aesop, and his enduring, though somewhat incomplete, 
investment insight was "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." To flesh out 
48 
this principle, you must answer only three questions. How certain are you that 
there are birds in the bush? When will they emerge and how many will there be? 
What is the risk-free interest rate (which we consider to be the yield on long-term 
u.s. bonds)? If you can answer these three questions, you will know the 
maximum value of the bush-and the maximum number of the birds you now 
possess that should be offered for it. And, of course, don't literally think birds. 
Think dollars. 50 
When calculating intrinsic value you act as a scale. Your job is to weigh the facts 
and determine the number where the needle will rest. Not all scales are calibrated the 
same, nor do they weigh all the facts. In fact, Graham pointed out that in the short-run the 
market uses a voting machine where fear and greed are the most important factors. These 
should not register on a fact weighing scale. Buffett is fond of saying that if you put 
garbage into even the most intricate and precise financial model you will get garbage out 
the other end. Therefore, a simple valuation model that calls for conservative assumptions 
produces a dependable and reasonable intrinsic value calculation. Below is a presentation 
of the standard model employed by the TV AlC: 





Clayton earns $1.03 a share for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2000. (A $1.03 
EPS is the analysts' current consensus estimate.) 
Both earnings and dividends (currently at $.06 per share) grow at a 15% per 
annum rate for the next five years. In five years, the price/earnings ratio will be 
lOX. (The analysts' consensus estimate of earnings growth for the next five years 
is 18% per annum. If earnings grow at 15% per annum, chances are that it will 
49 Warren Buffett An Owners Manual, January 1999, p. 7. 
50 Warren Buffett, 2000 Annual Report, p. 13. 
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sell for more than 10 times earnings. In short, I'm being conservative. Its 
historical average PIE is about 15 or 16 times.) 
(3) An appropriate discount rate for this stock is 12%. (Again this is conservative. 
Almost no one employs so high a discount rate for good companies.) 
(4) You hold the stock five years and then sell. (I also ignore taxes.) 
WHA T IS THIS STOCK WORTH? 
PRICEs = 10X[$1.03X(1.15)5] 
= $20.71 
1 (1.15)5 
PV DIV = $.06X1.15X 1.12 
= $.32 




The stock's worth now (its intrinsic value) equals: 
INTRINSIC_ VALUE = PV _PRICEs + PV _DIV 
= $11.75+$.32 
= $12.07 
Conservatively valued, Clayton is worth $12.07, and since it is selling for $8, it has a 
margin of safety of about 50%. That is, the stock's worth about 50% more than its 
current selling price. 
WHAT IS THIS STOCK'S EXPECTED RATE OF RETURN FOR THE FIVE-YEAR 
HOLDING PERIOD? 
EXPECTED _RETURN = RETURN _FROM _CAPITAL_APPRECIATION +CURRE 
DIVIDEND RETURN 
= 10J(PRICE5J~ - J + 100( DIV J l PRICEo J PRICEo 
~ 1O{($2~871): _}iO{$$~6) 
= 21 7%_per _annum 
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RISK CONSIDERED: Manufactured housing - Clayton's industry -- is riskier than 
many industries, and an investor must carefully consider 
whether this risk is acceptable. 
A SIMPLE STOCK VALUATION ILLUSTRATION 
USING eLA YTON HOMES AS AN EXAMPLE 
January 17,2001 
Clayton Homes (symbol CMH) was selling for $14 1/16 per share today, its current PIE 
ratio is 15.29, and its 5-year average PIE is 136. Among the analysts following the 
stock, the high EPS estimate for fiscal year 2002 (ends June 30, 2002) is $.99 per share, 
and the analysts' estimated 5-year earnings growth rate is 14% per annum. The stock is 
paying a $.06 dividend per share. If you bought this stock today for $14 1/16 a share, 
what is your expected rate-of-return per annum for a 5-year holding period? What is this 
stock's intrinsic value? 
For your Clayton valuation, use the 13.6X PIE ratio figure, and use a 12% discount 
rate to calculate the intrinsic value. 
ANSWERS: Expected rate-of-return = 13.67%; Intrinsic value = $15.14 
A Note on "Look Through" Earnings 
Due to GAAP accounting rules the retained operating earnings of subsidiary 
companies are not included in operating earnings reported in SEC filings. Therefore, a 
company's reported earnings have to be adjusted for retained operating earnings in 
investees that are not reported in profits. The formula Buffett uses follows: 
(1) Operating Earnings Reported In The SEC filing 
(2) + The Retained Operating Earnings Of Major Investees 
(3) - An Allowance For The Tax That Would Be Paid By The Company Had The 
Above Earnings Been Distributed 
(4) Look Through Earnings 
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The importance of calculating "Look Through" earnings should not be overlooked. This 
process forces you to consider long-term business prospects. Thus, you will avoid the 
popular approach of focusing on the short-term 
51 Warren Buffett, 1994 Annual Report, p.ll. 
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Graham taught that investing is best when it is most business like. By focusing on 
the long-term, you can approach your investments as the CEO of a company would. Your 
job is to allocate capital to projects that will increase the earnings of your company (the 
underlying earnings of the portfolio). In the long-run securities prices are reflective of 
earnings: "It's true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard for investment 
decisions is market price. But prices will be determined by future earnings. In investing, 
just as in baseball, to put runs on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not the 
scoreboard. ,,52 
Learning to Invest by Investing 
The TV Ale program was founded on the idea that the best way to learn about 
investing is by making actual investments with real money. Just as students studying a 
foreign language learn much quicker from complete immersion, students of investments 
benefit immensely from hands on investment experience. Employing knowledge in a 
real-world capacity requires more than a "multiple-choice" understanding. Having been 
presented with our investment philosophy and the screening and valuation tools 
necessary for implementation, you are now prepared to develop your investment skills. 
The case examples that follow should serve as a guide for tying all of the above together. 
Case Studies 
AmeriCredit Corporation (ACF) 
52 Warren Buffett, 1991 Annual Report, p. 4. 
52 
Company Overview 
AmeriCredit Corp. has been operating in the automobile finance business since 
September 1992. Through its branch network, the Company purchases auto finance 
contracts without recourse from franchised and select independent automobile 
dealerships and makes loans directly to consumers buying late model used and new 
vehicles. ACF targets consumers who are typically unable to obtain financing from 
traditional sources. Funding for the Company's auto lending activities is obtained 
primarily through the sale of loans in securitization transactions. The Company services 
its automobile lending portfolio at regional centers using automated loan servicing and 
collection systems. ACF's typical borrowers have experienced prior credit difficulties or 
have limited credit histories. 
Locating Value in the Market - ACF gets caught in our screen 
Beginning in August of 200 1 ACF began a steady decline from its all time high of 
over $64 to a two year low of $14 in November of 200 1. Consistent employment of our 
Market Data Screen allowed us to identify this opportunity. First, we noticed ACF's 
repeated appearance in our daily review of the Market's 100 Biggest Losers. ACF's 
decline was also noted by other investors, resulting in an increase in ACF shares being 
sold short Therefore, our Short Interest screen indicated that pessimism was starting to 
take its discounting effect on ACF's price tag. Mounting Pessimism could also be 
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observed in negative news coverage from a myriad of fmancial media. Finally, our 
interest peeked in November of2001 when ACF showed up on our NYSE HighslLows 
screen. 
Employing the Value Checklist 
The scenario described above is not uncommon. Hundreds of companies each 
year fall out of favor with the market and experience the punishing effects of market 
pessimism. Thus, they too would be caught in our screen. We do not support a blind 
contrarian approach. Keep in mind that the gold nuggets are rare. Most of the companies 
that get caught in our strainer are just rocks. We throw the rocks back. 
How do we distinguish the rocks from the gold nuggets? We employ our value 
checklist. The checklist serves as a scrub brush. The metrics that make up its bristles 
wash away the mud and give us a clear view of the stone we are considering. 
After scrubbing ACF we were pleased with what was hidden under the 
pessimism. At its low of $14 dollars per share ACF was selling at 1.1 times Tangible 
Book Value of$12.71. 2001 Earnings Per Share of$2.66 and the consensus 2002 
estimate of $3.74 implied a Price to Earnings multiple of 5 times and 4 times, 
respectively. We considered a Debt to Equity ratio of 2.2 times to be reasonable. In just 
four months ACF's share price had dropped 78%. Finally, a five year Average Return on 
Equity of 21. 64% suggested the company possessed some kind of competitive advantage. 
All of these signs combined with favorable research on management merited a closer 
look. 
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Taking a Closer Look 
If after employing our checklist the clues suggest that a stone may have some 
hidden value, we will increase the magnification of our analysis. While touring 
Borsheims, Buffett's Jewelry operation, members of the Financial Management 
Association learned that a good jeweler's lupe, with magnification capabilities of 30 to 50 
times, is an essential tool in intelligent jewelry purchasing. Likewise, research of similar 
magnification separates precious investments from costume jewelry. 
Qualitative Analysis 
During the timeframe of our analysis the economists were issuing consensus 
declarations that the u.s. economy was, in fact, in a recession. Secondly, the market was 
under attack by what has been dubbed "Enronitis," an epidemic that crippled any 
company with unclear accounting items. A slowing economy would have a negative 
impact on automobile purchases, decreasing loan originations, and increasing loan 
defaults. This last consideration is magnified in ACF's case, for its loan portfolio consists 
of sub-prime credit risks. ACF is focused on purchasing, securitizing, and servicing 
automobile loans. Lacking a diversified revenue stream to protect it against the 
deteriorating economic environment, the investment community considered ACF's short-
term prospects to be very unfavorable. Investor's focus on the short-term coupled with 
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accounting concerns about the subjectivity of calculating the loan loss allowance account 
were enough to cause ACF to fall out of favor. 
In short, Mr. Market was looking to sell, and sell fast. It is logical to assume that a 
developed economy experiencing a recessionary period will recover in a reasonable 
amount of time. By reasonable, we mean within five years. Buffett suggests that "if you 
are not willing to own a stock for ten years, you should not hold it for ten minutes." 
Therefore, we considered a recovery to be a logical assumption to take into 
consideration of our valuation of ACF. The recovery would have the exact opposite 
impact of the recession: car loan demand would increase; credit losses would diminish; 
and concerns about loan loss allowances would disappear. Investors would undoubtedly 
see ACF's focused revenue stream as well positioned for growth. As earnings grow and 
pessimism shifts to optimism, per share market value will benefit from multiple 
expansion. Furthermore, ACF's already dominant market position would likely be 
enhanced by the tendency of smaller players to be driven out of business during times of 
a weak economy. 
Of course, when valuing a financial company you must consider the effects of 
interest rates. We considered the positive interest rate environment in existence during 
the time of our valuation to create a countering effect to any increased expense that might 
result from rising loan defaults. Thus, the increase in expenses from loan defaults would 
be favorably offset by wider net interest margins due to lower fund costs. This scenario, 
of course, will reverse as interest rates climb, as they might do if a recovery seems to be 
proceeding too rapidly. Therefore, after purchasing ACF we would monitor the interest 
rate environment and its impact on cost of funds. 
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Intrinsic Valuation Calculation 
Assumptions: 
( 1) We used the 2001 earnings per share figure of $2.66. 
(2) Analyst Consensus Estimates of a 25% growth rate over the next five years is 
dependent on geographic expansion, new branch openings, market share gains, and 
strategic alliances. Given the deteriorating economic environment we used a more 
conservative 20% growth rate in our calculation. 
(3) We used a forward price/earnings ratio of 12X. If earnings grow at 20% chances are 
that it will sell more than 12X earnings. Its historical PIE is about 15 or 16 times. 
(4) An appropriate discount rate for this stock is 15%. (Again this is conservative. Almost 
no one employs so high a discount rate for good companies.) 
(5) You hold the stock for five years and sell. (We also ignore taxes) 
What is this Stock Worth? 
Price in Five Years = 12X[$2.66X(1.20Y5] 
= $79.43 
PV Price in Five Years = $79.43 
(1.15Y5 
= $39.49 
The stock's worth now (its intrinsic value) equals: 
Intrinsic Value = PV Price in Five Years + Present Value of Dividend 
= $39.49 + $0* 
= $39.49 
* ACF pays no dividend 
Conservatively valued ACF is worth $39.49 per share. At its low of $14 per share it had a 
margin of safety of 182%. Unfortunately, by the time we completed our analysis the 
share price had increased to $21.33. Despite this large adjustment, an 85% margin of 
safety still existed. 
What is the Stock's Expected Rate of Return for the Five-Year Holding Period? 
Expected Return = Return From Capital Appreciation + Current Dividend Return 
= 1 00 [(Price in Five Years/Current PriceY(l/5) -1] + 100(Div/Cur Pr) 
= 100[($79.43/$21.33Y(1/5) - 1] + 100(0/0) 
= 30.08% per annum 
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The Purchase Decision 
The final question: Is this company and our valuation consistent with our 
investment philosophy? Our intrinsic valuation uses conservative assumptions and 
reveals a substantial margin of safety exists at the current share price We have good 
predictability because the company is simple and focused. We have and do own a number 
of financial companies; therefore, we have some experience with the industry. Thus, we 
are within our circle of competence. Finally, the existence of extreme pessimism is 
consistent with our theory of maximum pessimism. It is time to swing the bat: "Similarly, 
in the world of securities, courage becomes the supreme virtue after adequate knowledge 
and a tested judgment are at hand.,,53 
The Rest of the Story 
We chose to concentrate in ACF purchasing 440 shares at $22.05 per share on 
January 14,2002. At the market's close on April 25, 2002 shares of ACF were trading at 




Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc. is the holding company parent of Anheuser-
Busch Inc. (ABI). In addition to ABI, which is the world's largest brewer of beer, the 
Company is the parent corporation to a number of subsidiaries that conduct various other 
business operations. The Company's operations are comprised of the following business 
segments: domestic beer, international beer, packaging, entertainment and other. 
Locating Value in the Market - BUD gets caught in our screen 
During a three week stretch in September of2001, BUD declines sharply from 
over $44 per share to $39 per share. Consistent employment of our Market Data Screen 
allowed us to identify this opportunity. We noticed BUD's repeated appearance in our 
daily review of the Market's 100 Biggest Losers. At $39 dollars BUD was selling near a 
52-week low; therefore, we probed the issue for value. 
Employing the Value Checklist 
After probing BUD our interest increased. At its low of $39 dollars per share 
BUD was selling at a Price to Earnings multiple of 20 times and 18 times, respective of 
2001 Earnings Per Share of$1.89 and the consensus 2002 estimate of$2.14. At these 
multiples BUD's Price to Earnings ratio was at a discount to the S&P multiple of23. 
BUD's impressive Return on Equity increased in lockstep over the last ten years from 
53 Benjamin Graham, Intelligent Investor, 4th ed., Harper & Row., 1973 p. 287. 
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22.2% to 38.6%. BUD had also announced a share repurchase plan that would benefit 
earnings per share going forward. Finally, Management is the best in the industry. 
Qualitative Analysis 
During the timeframe of our analysis the world was fraught with uncertainty. The 
economy was reeling from a recession, although there were still some who would not 
admit that we were in fact in a recession. Magnifying this scenario was the terror that 
manifested itself on September eleventh. The world had suddenly become a scary place, 
and the market would reflect this. Therefore, we decided to look for investment 
opportunities in "defensive" companies. 
When times get tight, companies that have large economies of scale and effective 
cost controls can absorb pricing pressures and maintain earnings growth while increasing 
market share. As the largest brewer in the world BUD was a logical play given the 
market forces at work. Furthermore, BUD possesses a huge advantage through its various 
subsidiaries that include can manufacturing, metalized paper printing, and barley malting. 
These operations help insulate earnings from rising packaging and ingredient costs. 
Finally, BUD's twelve brewery distribution system, strategically located across the U.S., 
is by far and away the most progressive and economical system. Thus, cost cutting could 
offset any threat pricing pressure might pose. 
We considered industry pricing pressure to be a short-term concern. Industry 
demographics are extremely favorable as the next decade will have strong growth in the 
21 to 27 year old population. Furthermore, increasing wealth across the world has 
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substantially increased the disposable income available for leisure activities. Therefore, a 
return to more normal operating conditions in the future should allow BUD to price its 
products aggressively and reduce its discounts to retailers. This coupled with the margin 
expansion from cost cutting could result in upward earnings adjustments. 
In fact, we welcomed short-term industry pricing pressure. Our logic was that as 
discretionary spending started to affect people's consumption choices, BUD was well 
positioned to capture market share from the other premium and import producers. 
Looking to save a little, we reasoned that traditional premium and import drinkers would 
find BUD's attractively priced premium and secondary lines an appealing substitute. 
Secondly, traditional drinkers of BUD's premium lines would not be lost, but would most 
likely take advantage of the myriad oflesser expensive options BUD offers. BUD has an 
enormous competitive advantage in the diversity and quality of its product and the loyalty 
of its customers. 
BUD's stable of Brands is impressive: Budweiser, Bud Light, Bud Dry, Bud Ice, 
Michelob, Michelob Light, Michelob Dry, Michelob Golden Draft, Busch, Busch Light, 
Natural Light, Natural Pilsner, King Cobra, Red Wolf, and non-alcoholic malt beverages 
Q'Doul's and Busch NA. During 1997, the company introduced the following brands: 
Hurricane Ice, Catalina Blonde, Michelob Honey Lager, Michelob Maple Brown, 
Michelob Pale Ale, Michelob Porter, Michelob Spiced Ale, and Tequiza. 
Despite being in existence since 1875, BUD continues to find ways to grow. 
Innovative new product offerings such as Tequiza in 1998 and the introduction of the 
new Bacardi Silver malt beverage product in 2001 complement the strong growth from 
increased sales of Bud Light This new product represents a group ofmalternatives that 
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have expanded the traditional market by 3% mainly to a new female customer base. 
Finally, BUD was making all the right moves for the next big development in the 
industry, international competition. BUD holds a 50.2% direct and indirect interest in 
Modelo (Mexico's largest brewer) and its operating subsidiary, Diblo. BUD also owns an 
18.5% position in Cerveccias Unidas S.A., the leading brewer in Chile, holding a 90% 
market share. 
A final unquantifiable aspect of BUD is its veteran Management. Sixty-four year 
old chairman August Busch III is joined by a host of far and away the best managers in 
the industry. Their track record of 16% earnings growth and an average Return on Equity 
of28.12% over the last decade are extraordinary in a mature company in an established 
industry. We considered BUD's divesting of its various non-beer operations to be an 
encouraging sign of management's renewed focus on its core products and growth. 
Finally, the Busch family is still closely involved with and heavily invested in the daily 
operations of BUD. We were encouraged that management's interests were aligned with 
shareholder's interest, and viewed favorably a partnership with the Busch family. 
Intrinsic Valuation Calculation 
Assumptions: 
(1) We used the 2002 consensus earnings per share figure of $2. 14. 
(2) Both Earnings and dividends (currently at $.69 per share) grow at an 11% per annum 
rate for the next five years. In five years, the price to earnings ratio will be 21X. 
(3) An appropriate discount rate for this stock is 10%. 
(4) You hold the stock for five years and sell. (We also ignore taxes) 
What is this Stock Worth? 
Price in Five Years = 21X[$1.89X(1.11Y5] 
= $75.73 
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PV _Div = $.69Xl.11X[(1-(1.1111.1)"5)/(.1-.11)] 
= $3.55 
PV Price in Five Years = $75.73 
(1.1)"5 
= $47.02 
The stock's worth now (its intrinsic value) equals: 
Intrinsic Value = PV Price in Five Years + Present Value of Dividend 
= $47.02 + $3.55 
= $50.57 
Conservatively valued BUD is worth $50.57 per share. At its low of $39 per share it had 
a margin of safety of 30%. Unfortunately, by the time we completed our analysis the 
share price had increased to $41.43. Despite this adjustment, a 22.05% margin of safety 
still existed. 
What is the Stock's Expected Rate of Return for the Five-Year Holding Period? 
Expected Return = Return From Capital Appreciation + Current Dividend Return 
= 100[(Price in Five Years/Current Price),,0/5) -1] + 100(Div/Cur Pr) 
= 100[($75.73/$41.43)"0/5) - 1] + 100(.69/41.43) 
= 14.5% per annum 
The Purchase Decision 
The final question: Is this company and our valuation consistent with our 
investment philosophy? Buffett believes in buying stock only when the stock has a nice 
margin of safety. The 22.05% margin of safety suggested by our valuation is not 
substantial. However, Buffett suggests that he would rather "buy a good business at a fair 
price than a fair business at a good price." BUD is an outstanding business with favorable 
economics and excellent management. Furthermore, it has a defendable moat in its 
economies of scale and brand loyalty. 
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The comfort level we felt with the predictability of BUD's performance and our 
assumptions was an unquantifiable component of our intrinsic valuation. Our comfort 
was further enhanced by our familiarity with the company and its products. We 
understood the business; it was clearly within our circle of confidence. Buffett told us in 
Omaha in 1999 that he was having trouble finding a dollar's worth of value for $.80. 
When we purchased this company we were experiencing the same trouble. Therefore, we 
elected to purchase a good business at what we felt was a fair price. 
The Rest of the Story 
Because the margin of safety was not substantial, say over 50%, we chose not to 
concentrate in BUD. We limit our concentration strategy to "homeruns" and "no-
brainers." We purchased 120 shares at $42.125 per share in late September 2001. 
By May of2002 we sold our position in BUD for over $52. In less than six 
months we recorded a 24.5% gain in this holding. 
Why did we sell? 
Insider sales of810,358 shares in the month prior to our selling became a concern. 
The majority of these sales had been from Chairman Busch III, with 220,368 shares sold 
for proceeds of$10,918,460, Vice-President Busch IV, with 113,543 shares sold for 
proceeds of$5,610,357, and President Stokes, with 107,000 shares sold for proceeds of 
$4,568,800. Therefore, top officers had sold $21,097,617 worth of stock in the last 
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month. Reviewing our intrinsic value we found BUD's appreciation resulted in its shares 
selling to be selling at a negative 2.8% Margin of Safety. Having identified a more 
attractive opportunity for our funds, we sold our position and reinvested the proceeds in 
an issue offering a greater discount to intrinsic value. 
Sell Decisions 
Good purchases will limit portfolio turnover. Buffett is fond of saying: "Our 
portfolio shows little change: We continue to make more money when snoring than when 
active." By limiting sale decisions you limit trading costs and defer taxes that can result 
in a substantial increase in return. 
Sound purchases should be held according to Buffett's advice below: 
Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most business 
managers would dream of feverishly trading highly-profitable subsidiaries 
because a small move in the Federal Reserve's discount rate was predicted or 
because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views on the market. Why, 
then, should we behave differently with our minority positions in wonderful 
businesses? The art of investing in public companies successfully is little different 
from the art of successfully acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want 
to acquire, at a sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, 
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honest management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these 
qualifications are being preserved. 
If you own sound businesses, you should only be selling if either the company's 
favorable qualifications are deteriorating or upon approaching your intrinsic value 
calculation you determine your capital can be deployed substantially better in another 
issue in the market. The decision to sell BUD was the result of the latter. 
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Low Price In Relation To Tangible Book Value 
Roger Ibbotson, Professor in the Practice of Finance at Yale School of Management and 
President ofIbbotson Associates, Inc., a consulting firm specializing in economics 
investments and finance, in Decile Portfolios of the New York Stock Exchange, 1967-
1984, Working Paper, Yale School of Management, 1986, studied the relationship 
between stock price as a percentage of book value and investment returns. To test this 
relationship, all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange were ranked on 
December 31 of each year, according to stock price as a percentage of book value, and 
sorted into deciles. (A decile is 10% of the stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange.) The compound average annual returns were measured for each decile for the 
18-year period, December 31, 1966 through December 31, 1984. 
As shown below, stocks with a low price to book value ratio had significantly better 
investment returns over the 18-year period than stocks priced high as a percentage of 
book value. 
Stock Price as a Percentage of Book Value, 1967-1984 
Compound Value of $1.00 Invested 
Decile Annual Return on 12/3'/66 at 12/31/84 
(Lowest price as % of book value) 14.36% $12.80 
2 14.40% 12.88 
3 14.39% 12.87 
4 12.43% 9.26 
5 8.82% 4.98 
6 8.36% 4.6 
7 7.69% 4.09 
8 5.63% 2.83 
9 5.26% 2.65 




Stocks Selling at Discounts to Net Current Assets 
Tweedy, Browne, using the same methodology over the same period, examined the 
historical returns of the stocks of (i) unleveraged companies which were priced low in 
relation to book value and (ii) unleveraged companies selling at 66% or less of net 
current asset value in the stock market. The sample included only those companies priced 
at no more than 140% of book value, or no more than 66% of net current asset value in 
which the debt to equity ratio was 20% or less. The results of this study of unleveraged 
companies that were priced low in relation to book value and net current asset value are 
presented in below: 
Unleveraged Companies: Price in Relation to Book Value, and Stocks Priced at 66% 
or Less of Net Current Asset Value, April 30, 1970 through April 30, 1981 
Holding Period 
Stock 6 Months 1 Year 2 Years 
Selection Average S&P Average S&P Average S&P 
Criteria Return 500 Return 500 Return 500 
140%- 120% of book value 1.60% 1.10% 15.80% 8.50% 36.50% 18.20% 
120%- 100% of book value 0.2 1.1 18 8.5 36.7 18.2 
100%- 80% of book value 0.8 1.1 19.4 8.5 39.4 18.2 
80%- 70% of book value 2 1.1 24.3 8.5 45.5 18.2 
70%- 60% of book value 1.1 19.8 8.5 42.1 18.2 
60%- 50% of book value 1 1.1 19.8 8.5 49.7 18.2 
50%- 40% of book value 1.4 1.1 23.7 8.5 53.7 18.2 
40%- 30% of book value 6.7 1.1 18.2 8.5 52.1 18.2 
30%- 0% of book value 8.6 0.7 32.8 6.8 60.2 20.8 





Low Price in Relation to Earnings 
Henry Oppenheimer, in "A Test of Ben Graham's Stock Selection Criteria," Financial 
Analyst Journal, September-October, 1984, examined the investment performance of the 
low price/earnings ratio stock selection criteria developed by Graham. This study 
screened securities listed on the New York and American Stock exchanges to select the 
issues that met Graham's criteria on each March 31 from 1974 through 1980. An investor 
who had employed Graham's criteria during this period achieved a mean annual return of 
38% as compared to 14% per year, including dividends, from the market index, the CRSP 
index ofNYSE-AMEX securities. The results are shown below: 
Benjamin Graham'S Price/Earnings Ratio Criteria 
Ben Graham 
Low PIE NYSE-AMEX Mean Median 
Firm Firm 
Annualized Annualized Size Size 
Holding Period Return Return (Millions) (Millions) 
4/74-3/76 26.16% 11.28% $178.80 $27.80 
4/75-3/77 38.4 14.76 368.9 40.4 
4/76-3/78 25.56 0.6 75 38.8 
4/77-3/79 29.64 9.96 62.3 33.1 
4/78-3/80 29.16 14.88 460.6 46.5 
4/79-3/81 32.28 23.04 183.9 61.5 




Small Market Capitalization 
Rolf Banz ranked all New York Stock Exchange listed companies according to market 
capitalization each year from 1926 through 1980, sorted the companies into quintiles, and 
measured the annual investment returns, on a market capitalization weighted basis, of 
each quintile. The results are shown below: 
Total Annual Returns on NYSE Stocks, 1926-1980 
Sorted into Quintiles According to Market Capitalization 
1 
(Largest) 2 3 
Compound Annual Return 8.9% 10.1% 11.1% 
Value of $1 Invested on 






TVA INVESTMENT CHALLENGE SYLLABUS 
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Fax (865) 974-1716, Office Hours 3:30-4:30 p.m. MW and most Fridays 3:30:4:00 p.m .. 
COURSE REQUIREMENTS 
(1) Meet every Thursday, 5:00-6:30 p.m. in SMC 436 Class attendance is required. 
(2) Subscribe to the Wall Street Journal. (The Wall Street Journal Interactive edition 
on the web also provides access to Barron's, which is an excellent investment 
publication.) Every week you must read Barron's, and every day you must read 
the Wall Street Journal. These should furnish you with some good investment 
ideas. (See Felicia for subscription forms.) Also, as much as possible, catch the 
New York Times Business section on the Internet (it's free). 
(3) Join FMA, regularly attend meetings, attend TVA's Investment Challenge 
Conference and Job Fair (Opryland Hotel in Nashville), and journey to Omaha 
with us to meet with Mr. Warren Buffett in February 2002. 
( 4) Actively research a number of companies and present the most promising 
research to the class. (Failure to perform this research will result in a poor grade.) 
Your research should be exhaustive and designed to either reject the company or 
suggest that it's a buy. You should include in your research a careful study of 
both the company and its competitor's annual reports, company visits -- if that's 
possible -- Conference Call information, study Value Line Investment Survey 
and Standard & Poors Reports, examine earnings estimates, insider sales and 
purchases, etc. You've got to employ some type of screening tool in order to 
discover undervalued companies. For initial screens, I rely heavily on 
morningstar.com's (or The Wall Street Journal's) daily stock high-lows and its 
lists of poorly performing industries, sectors and companies. [An extremely 
useful screen is The Wall Street Journal Online Markets Data Center's 100 
Biggest Losers and 52-Week Lows List. To find these, go to the Money and 
Investing section, and click the Markets Data Center. You're looking for 
good, simple companies that have been beaten way down. Every day you 
need to check these lists.] Remember that predictability is everything. If we 
don't have earnings and price predictability, we're not in the stock. Or after 
we've bought it we discover we don't have predictability, we're out of it. And you 
get predictability only from simple companies. (Buffett says that if it's not simple, 
he and Charlie won't understand it. If Charlie and Warren won't understand a 
company, you and I won't understand the company.) So look only at simple 
companies. Thevare the only stocks that give you predictability. All your life it 
would be good to remember John Bogle's view that "Simplicity is the master key 
to finanCial success." [Bogle is founder of the Vanguard Group.] Your research 
should include a calculation of the intrinsic value of the stock and the 
expected return assuming that the stock is held five years. [Bertrand Russell, 
the philosopher, also believes that to an important extent, the happy life is a 
simple life. Buffett is a great admirer of Russell.] 
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(5) Purchase a copy of Benjamin Graham's, The Intelligent Investor. We may have 
quizzes based on this material. (Buffett believes that this is by far the best book 
ever written on investments. I've been told that McKay's is a good place to 
purchase a used copy of The Intelligent Investor.) I plan to furnish you with some 
Warren Buffett Investment Philosophy material. If so, we may have a few 
quizzes based on it. Poor quiz scores will likely mean a poor TVAIC grade, and 
not being a value investor definitely will mean a poor grade. Also, if you aren't 
a value investor -- in the style of Ben Graham and Warren Buffett -- you'll be 
dropped from this class. 
(6) Track a hypothetical $100,000 portfolio, say on Quicken or Yahoo Finance. 
Hand a copy of your portfolio in each Thursday along with a brief paragraph 
when you buy explaining why you like the stock. Or if you're selling, why you're 
selling. Concentration is fine, and you shouldn't be selling often. (Ignore 
dividends and commissions for this exercise.) 
TVA Investment Challenge expectations are, in a word, high. In the past, some members 
of TV AlC have gotten a free ride, an easy A. It won't happen in the future. If we're 
going to beat the competition, we've all got to put a great effort into this class. 
WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE IN TVA INVESTMENT 
CHALLENGE 
Our primary aim is to transform you into intelligent, able, gifted investors. If this 
aim is substantially achieved, we should perform well in the TVA Investment 
Challenge competition -- winning many more than our share of prizes. This is an 
admittedly challenging goal, but it's also substantially doable if you'll really set your 
minds to it. Long ago, Ben Graham argued that you don't have to do extraordinary things 
to achieve extraordinary investment results. This goal is doable! And we'll also win our 
share of TV AlC contests if we're substantially achieving this aim. But it will require a 
great deal of work and discipline. What's the payoff? Riches beyond your imagination. 
In a real sense, we're prospecting for gold, we know it's there for certain -- even a rich 
vein -- and we know that it's discoverable if only we'll do our homework, properly 
diScipline ourselves, and develop the right mindset. 
What's involved in this process of becoming an "intelligent investor?" 
(1) Gain actual investment experience. The TVA Investment Challenge assumption -
- and it's a very good one -- is that to an important extent, you learn to invest by 
investing. 
(2) Learn and apply a sound investment philosophy. The investment philosophy we'll 
study and apply is Warren Buffett's investment philosophy. Always ask yourself 
this question before investing: "Would Buffett buy this stock?" If the answer is 
no, then you shouldn't buy it, and TV AlC shouldn't buy it. 
(3) Develop an emotional framework conducive to successful investing. For example, 
for Buffett, investing is merely a game that he enjoys immensely. The money's 
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not important to him, and this enables him to think clearly. My Christian beliefs 
help me to think clearly. 
(4) Gain as much in-depth knowledge as you can about as many companies and 
industries as you can. The more companies and industries you understand, the 
larger your investment universe and the greater the probability that you'll discover 
wonderful investment opportunities. But Buffett says that the size of your circle 
of competence isn't as important as clearly delineating that circle. Putting it in 
other words, Buffett has stated that, liThe first thing is to know what you know, 
and to know what you don't know. II It's a bad thing to think you understand a 
company, invest in it, and then later find out that you really didn't understand it 
from the outset. When you invest in a company you don't understand, the 
investment result is a flip-of-the-coin, and that's not going to make you any 
money. 
SOME PROBLEMS WE MAY ENCOUNTER APPLYING WARREN BUFFETT'S 
INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY. 
(1) Buffett is a strong believer in concentration; if an investment is really good, then you 
buy worthwhile amounts of it. Based on his rationale, we probably should own no 
more than about 6-10 stocks, and yet TV A's rules require us to own at least 15 
stocks. 
(2) Buffett believes in buying stock only when the stock has a nice margin of safety, 
meaning that it is worth substantially more than you have to pay for it. (Ben Graham 
often suggested at least 50% more. But Buffett told us in Omaha in 1999 that he has 
trouble finding a dollar's worth of value for $.80, and right now I wouldn't be 
surprised if he's got the same problem. To be sure, we'll have trouble finding good 
value. 
(3) Buffett -- who's arguably the world's greatest living investor -- has written that he 
would settle for one good investment idea a year. Big ideas are rare, and yet that's 
what we need and what we're looking for. [In Janet Lowe's new biography of Charlie 
Munger titled, Damn Right! (which I strongly recommend), Munger states that he 
and Buffett have only averaged about one big idea every three years.] That's why in 
practice you should concentrate if you want better-than-average investment results. 
Big ideas are so rare that when you do stumble across one, you need to buy a 
meaningful amount of that stock. Good investment ideas are rare, and yet we're 
supposed to come up with, maybe, 15 in three months. This is an especially big 
problem now because the stock market is high. [If you're content with average 
investment results, you should buy a highly diversified, minimal fee, broad-based 
index fund, like Vanguard's Total Stock Market Index fund. But in TVA's 
Investment Challenge, we can't invest in mutual funds or REITs.] 
(4) Buffett is a strong believer in long-term investing. (He says, "If you don't want to 
own a stock for ten years, then don't think of owning it for ten minutes. ") Thus, 
Buffett's philosophy may not work well for us in the short-term. But we still should 
generally buy stocks with good long-term prospects. Doing so will win us more 
contests than following any other investment practice. [If you know what you're 
doing, you can predict with useful accuracy long-term price movements; but often 
you don't have very useful short-term price predictability. If a stock is in fact 
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undervalued, you know it will eventually adjust upward, but you don't know when it 
will do so.] Al Auxier, August 22,2001 
Finally, any team member not making a substantial contribution to TVAIC will be 
dropped from the program at the end of the semester or sooner. We have to be 
tough about TVAIC membership if we are to excel in this program. 
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